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expressionism was rooted in the new experience of metropolitan life that transformed 
europe between 1860 and 1930. it [is] a visionary expression of what it feels like to 
be adrift, exhilarated, terrified in a fast-paced, incomprehensible world.
Jackie Wullschlager, ‘The original sensationalists,’ Financial Times
The modern economy began to supplant the traditional economy in several 
nations in the latter half of the 19th century – and many more in the latter 
half of the 20th. a system where self-employment and self-finance was typical 
gave way to a system of companies having various business freedoms and en-
abling institutions. This was the “great transformation” on which historians 
and sociologists as well as business commentators were to write volumes. The 
modern economy, where fully adopted, has indeed been transformative for 
nations1 – but much less so for economics.
if there is a thread running through my publications, particularly the work 
discussed here, it is that i have tried in that work to bear in mind the distinc-
tive nature of the modern economy.2 What is its nature?
i. Modern econoMies and Modern econoMics 
Many of the early contrasts between the two kinds of economy were drawn by 
sociologists. The traditional economy was said to rest on a community of per-
sons known to one other and engaged in mutual support – on Gemeinschaft   
– while the modern economy was said to be based on business, where people 
1  several  european  nations  saw  rising  opposition  to  modernism  in  the  19th  century  and 
proceeded in the interwar period to hamstring their modern economies with the institutions 
of a 20th century “corporatist” system of permissions, consultations and vetoes making business 
subservient to community and state.
2  This  recollection  focuses  on  the  main  works  of  mine  relating  to  imperfect  information 
and  incomplete  knowledge.  That  leaves  out  several  papers,  including  ones  on  risky  wealth 
accumulation, factor-saving bias in technical change.
*  McVickar Professor of Political economy and director, center on capitalism and society, 
earth  institute,  columbia  University.  for  discussions  related  to  this  lecture,  some  of  them 
stretching back decades, i am grateful to Philippe aghion, Max amarante, amar Bhide, Jean-
Paul fitoussi, roman frydman, Pentti Kouri, richard nelson and richard robb. raicho Bojilov 
and Luminita stevens gave creative research assistance.344
competed with one another – on Gesellschaft (Tönnies, 1887).3 social rank 
was said to count in a traditional economy but not in a modern economy. 
(Weber, 1921/22) True or not, these sociological contrasts did not obviously 
call for a fundamental revision of standard economic models.
Economic contrasts between the two systems were drawn by economic histor-
ians. a traditional economy is one of routine. in the paradigm case, rural folk 
periodically exchange their produce for goods of the town. disturbances, if 
any, are not of their doing and beyond their control – temperature, rainfall, 
and other exogenous shocks. a modern economy is marked by the feasibility 
of endogenous change: Modernization brings myriad arrangements from ex-
panded property rights to company law and financial institutions. That opens 
the door for individuals to engage in novel activity in the financing, develop-
ing and marketing of new products and methods – commercial innovations. 
The emergence of this “capitalism,” as Marx called it, in europe and america   
ushered in a long era of stepped-up innovation from about 1860 to 1940; fur-
ther waves of innovation have since occurred. The innovations undertaken were 
successful often enough that rapid cumulative economic change followed.
a few pioneering theorists, mostly from the interwar years, saw the com-
mercial innovativeness and the ongoing economic change as having systemic 
effects that altered people’s experience in the economy.
▪ innovativeness raises uncertainties. The future outcome of an innovative 
action  poses  ambiguity:4  the  law  of  “unanticipated  consequences”  applies 
(Merton, 1936); entrepreneurs have to act on their “animal spirits,” as Keynes 
(1936) put it; in the view of Hayek (1968), innovations are launched first, 
the benefit and the cost are “discovered” afterwards. The innovating itself 
and the changes it causes make the future full of Knightian uncertainty (1921) 
for non-innovators too. finally, since innovation and change occur unevenly 
from place to place and industry to industry, there is also uncertainty about 
the present: what is going on elsewhere, much of which is unobserved and 
some of it unobservable without one’s being there. Thus, even if every actor 
in the modern economy had the same understanding (“model”) of how the 
economy works, one would not suppose that others’ understanding is like one’s 
own. With modernization, then, another feature of a traditional economy 
– common knowledge that a common understanding prevailed – was lost.
3  Tönnies writes of the “anonymity” of transactors in Gesellschaft, that is, capitalism. That is 
a fair observation of classical perfect competition. But in my work on modern economies the 
entrepreneur, financier, manager, employee and customer are not exactly anonymous. firms 
acquire  employees  who  are  identifiable  and  nonsubstitutable;  firms  know  their  customers; 
customers know their supplier; and so on.
4  ambiguity and vagueness come into use with papers by ellsberg (1961) and fellner (1961).
  i do not mean to suggest that the modern economy has led to a net increase in total risk, 
measurable and unmeasurable. My sense is that much of the huge gain in productivity was 
brought by modernization rather than scientific advance and this gain has in turn permitted 
more and more participants to take jobs that offer reduced physical dangers and moral hazards. 
financial innovations have helped to reduce the risks created by modernization. it is plausible 
that the wide swings in business activity that finance capitalism imposes are no worse than the 
waves of famine and pestilence that afflicted traditional economies.34
▪ innovativeness also transforms jobs. as Hayek (1948) saw, even the low-
est ranking employees come to possess unique knowledge yet difficult to 
transmit  to  others,  so  people  had  to  work  collaboratively.  Managers  and 
workers too were stimulated by the changes and challenged to solve the new 
problems arising. Marshall (1892) wrote that the job was for many people the 
main object of their thoughts and source of their intellectual development. 
Myrdal (1932) wrote that “most people who are reasonably well off derive 
more satisfaction as producers than as consumers.”
far into the 20th century, though, economics had not made a transition to the 
modern. formal microfounded economic theory remained neoclassical, found-
ed on the pastoral idylls of ricardo, Wicksteed, Wicksell, Böhm-Bawerk and 
Walras, right through the 190s. samuelson’s project to correct, clarify and 
broaden the theory brought into focus its strengths;6 but also its limitations: it 
abstracted from the distinctive character of the modern economy – the endemic 
uncertainty, ambiguity, diversity of beliefs, specialization of knowledge and 
problem solving. as a result it could not capture, or endogenize, the observable 
phenomena that are endemic to the modern economy – innovation, waves of 
rapid growth, big swings in business activity, disequilibria, intense employee 
engagement and workers’ intellectual development. The best and brightest of 
the neoclassicals saw these defects but lacked a micro-theory to address them. 
To have an answer to how monetary forces or policy impacted on employment, 
they resorted to makeshift constructions having either no microeconomics be-
hind it, such as the Phillips curve and even fixed prices, or to models in which 
all fluctuations are merely random disturbances around a fixed mean.
after some neoclassical years at the start of my career i began building 
models that address those modern phenomena. so did several other young 
economists during that decade of ferment, the 1960s.7 at yale and at rand, 
in part through my teachers William fellner and Thomas schelling, i gained 
some  familiarity  with  the  modernist  concepts  of  Knightian  uncertainty, 
Keynesian probabilities, Hayek’s private know-how and M. Polyáni’s personal 
knowledge.  Having  to  a  degree  assimilated  this  modernist  perspective,  i 
could view the economy at angles different from neoclassical theory.8 i could 
try to incorporate or reflect in my models what it is that an employee, man-
ager or entrepreneur does: to recognize that most are engaged in their work, 
form expectations and evolve beliefs, solve problems and have ideas. Trying 
to put these people into economic models became my project.
6  one could argue that his textbook (1948) and Foundations (1947) began a restoration that 
saved the economics heritage from the radical Keynesians, institutionalists and behavioralists of 
that time.
7  Kindred spirits tilling the field or adjacent fields in the 1960s include robert clower, robert 
aumann, Brian Loasby, armen alchian, axel Leijonhufvud, richard nelson, sidney Winter, arthur 
okun, and William Brainard. They were joined in the 1970s and 1980s by roman frydman, steven 
salop, Brian arthur, Mordecai Kurz and Martin shubik. in the 1990s and 2000s amar Bhidé and 
alan Kirman joined in and both Thomas sargent and Michael Woodford tested the waters.
8  i did not explicitly put in these modernist concepts into models so much as i took out some 
neoclassical properties so that the models might be more consonant with modern thinking.346
eXPecTaTions in ModeLs of acTiViTy
Unemployment determination in a modern economy was the main subject 
area of my research from the mid-1960s to the end of the 1970s and again 
from the mid-1980s to the early 1990s. The primary question driving my early 
research was basic: Why does a surge of “effective demand,” that is, the flow 
of money buying goods, cause an increase in output and employment, as sup-
posed in the great book by Keynes (1936)? Why not just a jump in prices and 
money wages?
another question arose immediately: How could there be positive invol-
untary unemployment in equilibrium conditions – more precisely, along any 
equilibrium path? The answer implied by my model was that if there were not 
positive unemployment, employee quitting would, in general, be so rampant 
that every firm would be trying to out-pay one another in order to cut the 
high training outlay that comes with high turnover. To my mind, the argu-
ment did not rest on the “asymmetric information” premise that a worker 
could conceal his or her propensity to quit from an employer. (employers 
might know better what quit rates to expect than the employees themselves.) 
it rested on the impossibility of a contract protecting the employer from all 
the excuses for quitting the employee might be able to claim. There are also 
the abuses the employer could inflict on employees to force them to quit. in 
a modern economy, therefore, agreements are unwritten, thus informal, or, 
where written, not entirely unambiguous.
My approach to the relation between “(effective) demand” and activity 
started from the observation that, faced with all sorts of innovations and 
change, the market place of the modern economy was not just “decentral-
ized,” as neoclassical economists liked to say. The beliefs and responses of 
each actor in the economy are uncoordinated: Walras’s deus ex machina, the 
economy-wide auctioneer, is inapplicable to a modern economy in which 
much activity is driven by innovation and past innovation has left a vast differ-
entiation of goods. This led to the point that the expectations of individuals 
and thus their plans may be inconsistent. Then, some or all persons’ expecta-
tions are incorrect – a situation Marshall and Myrdal called disequilibrium.9 Thus 
the economy – say, a closed economy, for simplicity – might often be in situ-
ations where every firm (or a preponderance of firms) currently expects that 
the other firms are paying employees at a rate less than or perchance greater 
than its own pay rate. in the former example, every firm believes that, with its 
chosen pay scale, it is out-paying the others.
in my first model having a labor market capable of disequilibrium (Phelps, 
1968a), the effect of such an underestimate of the wage rates being set else-
where is to damp the wage rate that every such firm calculates it needs to pay 
in order to contain employee quitting by enough to minimize its total cost 
9  imaginably, random forces might come to the rescue but the expectations would still be 
incorrect ex ante. in my modeling i always excluded such random forces for the sake of clarity 
– forces that are the essence of the new classical model.347
(at present output) – the sum of its payroll costs plus turnover costs. in terms 
of a later construct, the “wage curve” is lowered by firms’ underestimating 
what will be the going wage at their competitors.10 such a lowering of the 
wage curve serves to lower firms’ cost curves, thus to lower the prices and, 
through the monetary block of the 1968 model, to increase output (achieved 
at  first  by  moving  employees  from  training  to  producing);  employment 
gradually expands thanks to reduced quitting caused by employee expecta-
tions that wages are lower at other firms than at their own. Later firms may 
step up hiring (from the initially reduced level) in response to the reduced 
costs and thus higher profit margins. What seemed to be a simple model was 
quickly revealed to be full of subtleties, so that very few students fully master 
it. However, the point that expectations matter for wages, prices and activity 
has been grasped. The economy is boosted by underestimation of competi-
tors’ wages and by firms’ underestimation in customer markets of their com-
petitors’ prices (Phelps and Winter, 1970). similarly, the economy is dragged 
down by overestimation.
What would happen in this economy, with its potential for disequilibrium 
and, say, increased disequilibrium, if aggregate demand shifted onto a higher 
path?11 i often studied an unidentified spending shock in the private sec-
tor that operated to increase the velocity of money and, if the central bank 
was slow to respond, would drive both the price level and money-wage level 
toward correspondingly higher paths – whether promptly or in a drawn out 
process. i supposed that this velocity shock would be neutral for quantities 
and relative prices if and when firms and workers formed correct expectations 
of the money-wage and price responses to the upward shift in the demand 
price.12 yet firms and workers have no way of perceiving such neutrality at 
the start.
What ensues? My models implied the following:13  every firm mistakenly in-
fers that, as often happens, all or much of the increase in demand it observes 
is unique to it; so in deciding how much to raise its wage it is led to underesti-
mate the rise of wage rates at the other firms. similarly, every customer-market 
firm in deciding how much to raise its price is led to underestimate the extent 
10  see shapiro and stiglitz (1984). calvo and Phelps (1983) derived a wage curve in a contract 
setting.
11  i was always aware that, in the version of the model in which all firms are ready at the drop of 
a hat to jump their money wages and prices, there being no set-up costs of doing so, a demand 
shock in a few cases might theoretically have no effect on quantities and relative prices. Take a 
sudden announcement  by the central bank that it is immediately doubling the money supply. if 
that shock is very public (it could not be missed by anyone) and its consequences are common 
knowledge, and if it is neutral for equilibrium values, there would result in the models i was 
studying an immediate doubling of money wages and prices; both output and employment 
would be undisturbed. Keynes (1936) also implicitly noted such exceptions.
12  This means that whatever the equilibrium employment path leading from the economy’s 
initial state, the velocity shock is neutral for that equilibrium path and every other equilibrium 
path, whether attained or not.
13  i am referring here to a fusion of my 1968 paper with Phelps-Winter (1970) and i am drawing 
on analyses and commentary in Phelps et al. (1970), Phelps (1972a) and Phelps (1979).348
to which the other firms are going to raise their price. as a result, the firm 
raises its price relative to what it believes the others are going to do but by 
little – by less than it would do if did not underestimate the rise elsewhere and 
less than the increase in its demand price; similarly it raises its wage but by 
little – by less than it would do if it did not underestimate the rise elsewhere. 
i added that “uncertainty” might induce a “cautious, gradual response in the 
firm’s wage decision.” (Phelps, 1968a, p. 688.)14
regarding quantities: The increase at each firm in customers’ demand 
sparked by the velocity shock causes the firm to recognize that, at the initial 
price and output, it can now sell more without having to lower its price. The 
firm, which was indifferent about a small increase of output before, then sees 
the profitability of an increase so it steps up its output.1 Hence there is an 
increase in the maximum stock of job-ready employees that the firm would 
retain in their entirety, thus an immediate jump in its vacancies. accordingly, 
the decreased quitting brought about by perceptions of an improved rela-
tive wage is not a reason for the firm to hire more slowly, so employment 
expands. as for the hiring response, there is a hitch. The firm could dip 
into the unemployment pool to acquire any amount of new employees but 
obtaining a job-ready employee requires diverting current employees from 
production to give the necessary job-specific training to the new recruit. But 
the firm in stepping up output actually moves employees out of training into 
production. Thus, increasing hiring has to wait until the decrease in quitting 
has allowed the firm to restore and then enlarge its training staff.16
The above are the impact effects of the demand shift. an adjustment process 
follows. in my models, a firm would at some point notice that its cumulative 
price increase had not cost it any of the erosion of its customer base it had 
expected and its wage increase was not bringing it any of the reduced quit 
rate it had expected. Moreover, following the initial impact of the velocity 
shock  on  demand  prices,  any  firm  supplying  a  specialized  assortment  of 
goods would experience a secondary increase in its demand price (at the ini-
tial output) since the initial price increases, all of them about the same size, 
do not generally have the substitution effect that the firm had worried about 
when it calculated its first responses. owing to all this “learning,” firms will 
raise their prices and wages again, bringing price and wage levels nearer to 
their equilibrium levels. even if expectations of the inflation rate remain nil, 
prices and wages will go on rising until the magnitude of the disequilibrium 
– the shortfall of the cumulative proportionate increase of the price level 
from the proportionate increase of velocity – has been eroded to the vanish-
14  it would be incorrect to infer that the quantity effects of effective demand shifts are present 
because a sort of wage “ridigity” is imposed in the end. There would be quantity effects anyway, 
though smaller and maybe less prolonged.
1  if as in my 1968 paper every firm raised its price fully so as to clear the market for its initial 
output, the increased profit margin would have the same effect.
16  overtime arrangements with employees are another way, of course, by which the training staff 
can be spared and even increased in order to permit a step up in hiring.349
ing point. along such a path, the shrinkage of wage underestimation reverses 
the decrease of quitting that powered the employment expansion, leaving 
the drain of the unemployment pool to cause a net elevation of the quit 
rate; and the shrinkage of both price and wage underestimation removes the 
firms’ desire for an elevated level of employment, so hiring does not increase 
to offset the increased attrition. Thus attrition works off the increase in em-
ployees now seen to be redundant. The price level as well as the real wage 
and employment are all driven to their new rest-point values. This recovery 
represents “equilibration” in the sense that expectations of the cumulative 
increase of the wage level and of the price level are brought into line with 
actual increases. (But the starting point, thus also the rest point, might not 
be full-fledged expectational equilibria, since expectations of wage or price 
levels may be wide of the mark in both states.)
yet my 1968 paper suggested that from each elevated employment level 
(such as those reached during the expansion) there exists an equilibrium path 
back to the initial state, a path along which not only has the underestimation 
of the increase in wages and prices vanished but, in addition, the expected 
increase of the wage level and of the price level is just matched by the actual 
increase. along any such path, the currently low (but subsiding) unemploy-
ment is continuously counter-balanced by the currently low (but subsiding) 
vacancy level so that firms are trying neither to out-pay nor under-pay one an-
other.17 in this respect, the subsequent model by Lucas (1972) differed from 
my work in that it has the tight implication that, following the disturbances 
of the current Lucas period, the economy immediately jumps to equilibrium as 
a consequence of his imposing “rational expectations.”18 in my thinking, 
market participants might at any time be able to walk the tightrope of the 
equilibrium path, if such exists, that leads from where they are currently to 
their initial state; but, in general, they cannot be presumed to find their way 
along such a path.
17  along this path the expected money-wage level is always that necessary, given the expected 
price level, for “labor market equilibrium” and the expected price level is always such, given the 
expected wage level, as to satisfy the condition for “product market equilibrium.” an explicit 
analysis of this equilibrium path for a non-monetary model without a customer market is Hoon 
and Phelps (1992). an analysis of this path upon making the product market a customer market 
can be found in Phelps, Hoon and Zoega (200) and Hoon-Phelps (forthcoming).
it  should  be  added  that  for  labor-market  equilibrium  there  is  another  condition  and 
corresponding equation. The firm has to get right the shadow price it attached to having another 
job-ready employee, thus to get right its calculation of its vacancies. This implies that the firm 
has correct expectations about the level to which market wages are heading over the near term, 
which in turn means correct expectations about the rate at which wages at the other firms are 
going to be rising over the near future, not just their current level.
18  This  is  jumping  to  a  point  in  Lucas’s  model,  which  is  analogous  to  jumping  onto  the 
equilibrium knife-edge path in my model. in Lucas’s period model, there is a Lucas period: 
before its end no national data are available and at its end all the national data are published. in 
my continuous-time models there might be lagged data on wage inflation etc. but not on wage 
levels, certainly not on levels at comparator firms. (in fact, firms can form associations to share 
such data and workers might form unions; but i had in mind a “free market” economy without 
these interventions.)30
Relation to ‘rational expectations.’ The above framework is not a closed sys-
tem. it does not deliver a fully determined steady state and is not intended to. 
The current level of vacancies has an exogenous structural component that 
is a function of what the managers guess to be the right value (i.e., shadow 
price) to put on having another employee; and that shadow price is variable 
not determined by the model. if that value jumps up, owing to impressions of 
some or all entrepreneurs that future prospects have brightened, vacancies 
increase and hiring will pick up – apparently out of the blue.19 This feature 
saves the model from being a mechanical apparatus leaving no room for in-
novation and resulting structural change.20
in the model as best interpreted, the firms in figuring their desired wage 
target have to form expectations of the average wage at competitors without 
benefit of recent publication (let alone observation) of these special wage 
rates.21 so, in general, the labor market is groping not toward equilibrium, in 
which the belief about the wage at competitors is equal to their actual wage, 
but toward a surrogate equilibrium in which expectations might, say, underesti-
mate the actual wage level (Phelps, 1972). Then the unemployment rest point, 
given the same vacancy rate, is below that steady level consistent with (expec-
tational) equilibrium. (of course, the gap between perception and reality is 
changeable.)
Last but not least, positing rational expectations equilibrium is not just in-
accurate as a way to close the model in the same sense as postulating rational 
choice is taken to be inaccurate: it is inappropriate to impose on the model. 
in a highly innovative economy and thus one subject to change, firms – even 
firms in the same industry and location – are all thinking differently. so a firm 
would have no grounds to reason, as it implicitly does in rational-expecta-
tions theory, that “since i have calculated i must raise my wages by x percent, 
i should now take into account that my competitors are planning to do the 
same; so i must now adjust my wage increase even more…” This kind of in-
ductive reasoning to arrive at the right expectations is inapplicable. That is 
the thesis of my piece (Phelps, 1983) in the frydman-Phelps volume.
More fundamentally, the public cannot form “rational expectations” about 
future probability distributions when the future is being created currently by 
the new ideas and consequent plans of entrepreneurs to which the public has 
no access and of which the entrepreneurs themselves are uncertain (calvo 
and Phelps, 1977). if firms are engaging in creative activity, “running regres-
19  Keynes’s “general” theory was general in taking entrepreneurs’ visions as floating – as arbitrary. 
The arbitrariness of these visions is important for the firm’s wage contract in calvo and Phelps 
(1977).
20  The model’s projection of the economy’s future path is contingent on constancy of the 
exogenous  part  of  the  vacancy  function,  though  the  actual  path  may  well  be  disturbed  by 
exogenous changes in vacancies.
21  at some places in my papers the mean wage level is taken to be known, as if recently published, 
but only in a variant model with a fixed wage commitment over some interval of the future. 
(such a point is on p. 701 in Phelps 1968a.) otherwise the wage is not known but is inferred 
from unfolding circumstantial evidence.31
sions” on past data will not give a firm an applicable prediction of what these 
firms are planning now to do in any respect. (see frydman and Goldberg, 
forthcoming). Understanding Keynes-fellner probabilities for use under un-
certainty, one gives less weight to historical projections of what they are up to 
when one understands that they are preparing a surprise. 
so, if asked whether my theory was superseded by the Lucas model, i 
would have to say that if an economy possesses dynamism, so that fresh un-
certainties incessantly flow from its innovative activities and its structure is   
ever-changing,  the  concept  of  rational-expectations  equilibrium  does  not 
apply and a model of such an economy that imposes this concept cannot rep-
resent at all well the mechanism of such an economy’s fluctuations. 
Relation to Friedman’s 1968 model. The above theory of the “natural rate” 
and deviations from it driven by misunderstood shifts and disturbances is 
often taken to be essentially identical to that presented by Milton friedman 
(1968). The two models are then treated as simultaneous discoveries of the 
same  thing.  in  fact  they  represent  discovery  of  two  distinct  phenomena. 
friedman’s is a model of the natural rate of labor force participation while 
mine is a model of the natural rate of unemployment. Myriad differences de-
rive from that distinction. for example, in the former model an unperceived 
increase in demand is an unwelcome deviation from competitive equilibrium 
while in mine it moderates a generally onerous volume of involuntary unem-
ployment. (Below i will briefly comment on a monetary policy aimed at high 
employment.)
Relation to Keynesianism. some have kindly commented that this work and 
related work in the Microfoundations volume (Phelps et al., 1970) was “revo-
lutionary” (Pissarides, 2006; samuelson, 2006). Two comments cry out to be 
made, however. one is that my sort of micro-macro modeling left standing 
some of Keynes’s core beliefs: effective demand shifts, even “neutral” ones, 
typically impact on business activity. furthermore, the price level and the 
money wage level are not perfect in equilibrating markets.22 on the other 
hand, my subsequent research endogenizing the natural unemployment rate 
has since dissociated me from some other core parts of the Keynesian policy 
position.
Use in a theory of optimum monetary policy. The first published application of 
this expectational framework was in modeling the optimal inflation policy 
(Phelps, 1967).23 This was a reaction to the emerging application of the 
Phillips  curve  (Phillips,  198)  in  modeling  the  “optimum”  inflation  rate 
(okun, 196). There were times when this 1967 paper seemed to me to have 
been bypassed by the rational-expectations based Taylor rule (Taylor, 1993, 
1999). yet my paper has continued to bear fruit in studies of historical dis-
22  scholars unearthed for posthumous publication (Keynes 1983) a draft chapter by Keynes 
entitled “The Uncoordinated economy” and Tobin, the leading american Keynesian, wrote that 
Keynes’ theory was about “expectational disequilibrium.” (Tobin 197).
23  This paper was written at the London school of economics in the early months of 1966 before 
i tackled the subjects of the 1968 and 1970 papers on wage dynamics and price dynamics.32
inflations (sargent, 1999). The economy Prize committee (2006) cited my 
research viewing policymaking from an intertemporal perspective. so i want 
to touch on that paper, which will be the main subject of the next section.
PoLicy To aLTer Undesired eXPecTaTions
My earliest work on policy from an intertemporal point of view was about fis-
cal policy in a moneyless economy. in Phelps (196) my premise was that, in 
general, the public might expect the present discounted value of their “life-
time” tax liability to be less than was foreseeable. (i cited david ricardo in de-
fense, some years before “ricardian” came to denote what he rejected.) The 
result, according to the model there, would be an over-demand for consumer 
goods and an under-supply of labor to the market economy. a policy of “fiscal 
neutrality” would align the expected lifetime tax liability in present value terms 
to the expenditures and transfers that the government expected to make. if 
the public did not possess rational expectations, tax rates would be set either 
higher or lower than would otherwise be necessary for neutrality. Thus was 
born the thought that market expectations matter for supply and they may 
be undesirable, so an “optimal” policy would correct such expectations.
The key premise of the 1967 paper was that the public’s expectations of 
the inflation rate might be undesirably high and that the only way the gov-
ernment authorities could induce the public to lower its expectations was 
to disappoint those expectations by forcing the actual inflation rate to be 
lower than the expected inflation rate – until the expected rate is down to 
the acceptable level. another premise was that unexpected inflation brings 
above-natural employment and unexpected disinflation brings below-natural 
employment, that is, above natural unemployment; thus “disinflation,” as i 
later called it, would entail a transition cost: the cost, economic and social, of 
a transitory bulge of the unemployment rate above the natural level, which 
could be realized if the authorities were to resign themselves to ratifying 
current inflation expectations by setting effective demand as to realize the 
natural unemployment rate. These ideas were then imbedded in a setting 
formally like the familiar model of optimum capital accumulation by ramsey 
(1928). The expected inflation rate, x, takes the role of the state variable 
played by the capital stock in ramsey’s model; the deviation of the actual 
inflation rate, f, from x is analogous to the deviation of consumption from 
income. in this exploration, the policy variable was fiscal – the demand level 
brought about by the size of the balanced budget, which leaves the public 
debt constant – and monetary policy stabilized investment demand so as to 
keep constant the capital stock. The analysis (done in 1966) did not go very 
easily and in my later book (Phelps, 1972a), done in 1969-70, the problem 
was simplified: inflation policy was conducted by the monetary authority and 
fiscal policy is supposed to neutralize effects on capital and public debt. in 
brief, the problem is to find the policy function f (x) that maximizes the pos-
sibly discounted utility integral subject to the differential equation dx/dt = 
β(f − x), β a positive pseudo-constant.33
The results: if the expected inflation rate is greater than (less than) the 
rest point level to which an optimal policy will bring it down, so there is a 
gap to be filled in, an optimal policy always requires driving the inflation 
rate below the currently expected rate, no matter the short-term gain. The 
greater the initial excess of the expected inflation rate over its rest point, of 
course, the greater is the size of the optimum deviation of actual inflation 
from expected inflation – and thus the greater is the initial increase in unem-
ployment. The smaller is the utility discount rate, the lower is the rest point 
target for the expected inflation rate and the greater is the optimum size of 
the initial shortfall – the greater, then, the near-term pain and the long-term 
gain. The greater is the costliness of decreased employment, the smaller is 
the optimum initial deviation – the smaller, then, the optimum deviation of 
unemployment from its natural level – and thus the slower the speed of the 
disinflation.
Looking back, it may be that my 1967 paper was the father of what came to 
be called inflation targeting.24 However, i was aware of a complication standing 
in the way of so simple a characterization of optimal monetary policy. in the 
last pages of the uncondensed discussion paper from which the published 
paper was extracted (Phelps, 1966a) i examined a richer model in which the 
unemployment rate, u, is sluggish (as in my 1968 paper) and is thus an added 
state variable alongside the expected inflation rate. Then the optimal policy 
function, f(x, u), does not generally drive the expected inflation rate mono-
tonically toward its rest point level. an initial unemployment rate far above 
or below its natural level may drive the optimal inflation rate above or below 
the expected inflation rate even if the latter is currently at its rest point level. 
But this expected rate will sooner or later loop back to its rest point while the 
unemployment rate goes to its rest point, the natural unemployment rate. 
The interest rate rule made famous by Taylor (1993) has the same character 
although it derives from optimizing policy in a different sort of problem 
– optimal stabilization of the inflation and unemployment rates around their 
means under “rational” expectations.
it might also be said that my 1967 and later works planted the idea that the 
function of the central bank is the management of inflation expectations – the 
idea that if the central bank will monitor and stabilize the expected inflation 
rate, the actual inflation rate will not get out of hand for long. Parametric 
shifts may drive the price level onto a different path but they will not per-
manently alter the trend growth rate of the price level. (i myself may have 
thought that.) in an economy operating under imperfect knowledge of the 
economy’s future prospects, there is always the possibility that the central 
bank will seriously misestimate the natural real interest rate. in that case, the 
central bank’s interest rate rule does not start off with the right constant term 
from which the real interest rate set by the bank is to deviate in response to 
24  Perhaps the earliest interest rate rule is that in dewald and Johnson (1963) but their rule does 
not drive any variable, such as the inflation rate, to a target level. neither do the proposed money 
supply rules. 34
a discrepancy between the expected inflation rate and the target rate. if the 
natural real rate is underestimated while everything else is perfectly gauged, 
the bank will set its real rate too low to hold inflation at the level it intended 
(Phelps, 2006d).
i would make another comment based on the imperfect knowledge of 
participants. some advocates of rational expectations complain about ex-
pectations that are adaptive as in my 1967 model (Lucas, 1976). The discus-
sion of “routine stabilization” in chapter 8 of my 1972 book recognizes that 
expectations will not be adaptive in any rigid way in the face of identical 
repetitions of the same experience and struggled for awhile with what to do. 
(The coefficient could not be a genuine parameter, fixed from disinflation to 
disinflation.) yet this point is not sufficient to establish the aptness of the pos-
tulate of rational expectations.2 dynamic economies do not have identical 
repeated games (“one never stands in the river at the same place twice,” as 
the chinese say), there is a diversity of opinion in markets, and a policymaker 
does not fall into one of a fixed set of types. (even Paul Volcker had to earn 
credibility.) Keynes believed that market players’ expectations cling to the lat-
est model until contrary evidence has piled up enough to shatter that model 
and open the way to a new model and radically different expectations. The 
adaptive expectations equation is an approximation of such a process.
sTrUcTUraLisT ModeLs of naTUraL raTe sWinGs and sHifTs
The long swings and large shifts of the unemployment rate without rising in-
flation or disinflation that have been observed over the past several decades 
in oecd countries – and, for that matter, the formidable inter-country dif-
ferences in unemployment rate – suggest that powerful forces have impacted 
on the natural unemployment path itself. indeed, many scholars in the early 
decades of the 20th century sought to explain booms and crises in terms of 
real market forces rather than monetary forces. any adequate explanation of 
the failure of the unemployment rate to regain its pre-bull-market level in the 
mid-1920s almost certainly requires a theory to “endogenize” the natural rate.
a non-monetary theory of the (path of the) natural unemployment rate began 
to develop in the 1980s built on the same employee training model and the 
customer market model i had used in the 1960s. an austere exploration in 
that direction (calvo and Phelps, 1983) focused on time preference and 
wealth but lacked unemployment. some two-country modeling (fitoussi and 
Phelps, 1986, 1988) focused on overseas interest rates and exchange rates but 
it lacked a natural rate. closed- and open-economy models with the desired 
features emerged in a series of research papers from 1988 through 1992 and 
2  i was glad to explore with John Taylor and later Guillermo calvo the rational-expectations 
based new Keynesian modeling of wage and employment determination in research done at 
columbia in the 1970s. (see Phelps and Taylor, 197, and Phelps, 1978.)  However i did not 
believe that the rational expectations premise was satisfactory or even clearly preferable to some 
flexible use of adaptive expectations.3
in a volume (Phelps, 1994) with the substantial help of Hian Teck Hoon and 
Gylfi Zoega.26 This was a more radical rewrite of macroeconomics than my 
micro-macro research in the late 1960s. The theory showed how wealth in 
relation to after-tax wages and to productivity impacts on the propensity to 
quit and thus the incentive-wage curve; the world real rate of interest, future 
prospects and some other forces impact on the shadow price firms place on 
their business asset – employee or customer; and these impacts disturb or 
permanently alter the natural rate itself (Phelps, 1994). i loved this theory. 
it depicts increases in the overseas real rate of interest as contractionary, 
contrary to the Keynesian  Hicks-Mundell-flemming model (where “velocity” 
is stimulated) and contrary to the neoclassical Hicks-Lucas-rapping model 
(where labor supply is increased). a real exchange rate depreciation caused 
by overseas events would over some range of parameters lead to contraction, 
gradually attenuated by a gain of customers, contrary to Keynesian thinking.
This  supplementary  theory  makes  clear  how  three  structural  forces  in 
the 1930s may have pushed up the natural unemployment rate:27 first, the 
specter of war hung over the U.s. as well as europe in the second half of the 
1930s, which must have damped investment activity, including acquiring new 
employees (Phelps, 2006a). second, the social security act reduced after-tax 
wages, yet in turn reduced private wealth – a nullifying effect; but it created 
“social wealth,” which has net contractionary effects (Hoon and Phelps, 1996; 
Hoon, 2006).
finally, my models to study “structural booms” showed that the sudden 
emergence of new prospects for innovation, in raising the shadow prices, 
would induce firms to hire and train increased employees in anticipation of 
the rise of productivity that lies ahead; its actual arrival raises the opportunity 
cost of investing in employees and customers (fitoussi et al., 2000; Phelps 
and Zoega, 2001). in this view, the 1930s soar of productivity was largely not 
an expansionary force; it was the anticipated fruit of the earlier investment 
boom and largely contractionary. for me this was revelatory work, as it saw the 
well-functioning capitalist economy as driven by unseen and visionary forces 
springing from the creativity and opportunity of business people – forces 
that cannot be imagined to obey any stationary stochastic formula (Phelps, 
2006d)28 – nor indeed any predeterminable stochastic formula (frydman 
and Goldberg, 2007).
26  some of the many papers from that period and further developments include Hoon-Phelps 
(1992), Phelps (1992), Zoega (1993), Hoon-Phelps (1997), Phelps-Zoega (1997), and Phelps-
Zoega (1998). some precursors are Phelps (1972b) and salop (1979).
27  it is worth mentioning that the extraordinary technical changes over the whole decade must 
have increased “frictional” unemployment, although the latter is outside my models.
28  There is a touch of rational expectations in my supposing that after a shift in the economy’s 
structure or future prospect the prices and quantities follow a perfect foresight path. But that 
foresight is conditional on the absence of further shifts in the future, while the model does not 
promise such shifts will not occur. The economy’s participants may very well be conscious of the 
possibility that the future will not hold further shifts. But they do not know what parameters 
shifts to anticipate and what their effects will be. That may be only a crude approximation to 
ignorance of the future but it may be better than no approximation at all.36
To sum up: The completed theory of activity that incorporates the above 
modeling of natural unemployment into the 1960s modeling says that em-
ployment increases in either or both of two ways: increased effective demand 
lifts employment off its present equilibrium path and actual money wages 
climb above their expected path. an upward shift of natural employment 
pushes up actual employment though by less than the natural increase and 
actual wages are driven below their expected path. in the past 30 years the fo-
cus of attention has swung away from effective demand shifts and swings under 
the tacit assumption that the natural rate of unemployment had moved little 
and toward shifts and swings of the natural rate itself under the tacit assump-
tion that effective demand is not a problem, at least not when the central 
bank has a good monetary policy. We would not have gotten to this level of 
understanding had it not been for the development of both the monetary and 
the structuralist elements of the complete theory.
THe BUsiness of GroWTH
in neoclassical economics, the objects of the theory were not human endeavor 
as we know it – only “prices and quantities.” There was a disconnect from his-
tory and the humanities. neoclassical growth theory was conspicuous in having 
no people in it. it explained the accumulation and investment of physical 
capital yet the driving force in that story – increases in knowledge, called 
“technology” – rains down exogenously, like manna from heaven – and the 
selection among new technologies is instantaneous, costless and error-free. 
Though in fact crucial for growth, a human role over a vast range of activities 
involving management, judgment, insight, intuition and creativity is absent.
nowhere was that character of neoclassical theory more evident than in 
the theory of national saving. The model by ramsey (1928) was the prime ex-
ample and another was my neoclassical model of risky wealth accumulation 
(Phelps, 1962). at Penn i thought it might be fruitful to stop modeling the 
nation as a sort of infinite-lived “single agent” and imagine instead a sequence 
of generations of people connected by bequests. The paper by Phelps and 
Pollak (1968) solved the puzzle of how much each generation would save in 
“game equilibrium” and confirmed that more is involved in the saving deci-
sion than technocratic considerations: the rate of time preference and the 
rate of return to saving. each generation’s selfishness also matters. (see also 
Phelps, 1973.)29
in another paper i explored the idea that technological progress requires 
the allocation of people to research (Phelps, 1966b). a technical progress 
function described the relationship between the rate of technological pro-
gress and the magnitude of the research activity. To be sure, the larger the 
size of the research input maintained over the years, the faster will be the 
29  Later Laibson (1997) applied the theory to a person having future selves distinct from the 
present self.37
climb of the technology variable. yet the proportionate rate of progress is 
diminishing, even if the absolute gain per unit time is increasing. i began 
investigating whether an increasing volume of research effort through time 
could stave off the slowdown of the rate of progress. i found that, with a 
suitable specification of the progress function, exponential growth of the 
research input would lead gradually to exponential growth of the technology 
variable. This led rather quickly to the uncovering of two implications, both 
of them intriguing.
an obvious implication was that the higher is the level of the exponential 
growth path of the research input, the higher would be the level of the ex-
ponential growth path to which the path of the technology variable would 
approach. To a novice, then, it would seem that the greater the effort society 
puts into research the better. But economists care also about consumption – 
indeed some care only about that. i built a simple model in which consump-
tion was produced (using the current technology) by all the population who 
did not do research. i found that up to a point the greater the ratio of research 
input to non-research input, the higher the level to which the consumption 
path would approach. But after that point further increases in that ratio would 
actually decrease consumption, since the gain in technology achieved would 
not repay the cost of pulling labor out of producing the consumer good. 
This was another Golden rule for my collection of such rules (Phelps, 1961, 
1966c). a strange thing was that one could put a number to the ratio. it is 
equal to one: one researcher for every producer.
The other implication was that a larger population would provide a larger 
number for research and thus permit a climb onto a higher technology path 
(Phelps, 1968b). The historical applications are obvious. Had it not been 
for the vast population increase beginning in the 18th century and only now 
winding down, the number of minds could have achieved only a small pro-
portion of the colossal technological advance of the past two centuries. so we 
can be grateful for the population explosion – my Mozart Proposition, as it 
was called. on this logic, economic growth in the 21st century will be faster 
than in the 20th.
no one standing at the threshold of the 18th century could have predicted 
that  population  would  explode  or  know  what  the  probability  of  such  a 
“regime” was. no one could have known that the progress function would 
continue to make research so productive of technological advances. This re-
minds us that Knightian uncertainty hangs over most anything of importance 
and that centuries of under-forecasting can occur.
“research”  and  “technology”  here  are  less  narrow  than  they  might  be 
supposed. The technology includes the original screenplays that pile up at 
MGM, from which future movies can be made, and the inventions of Wagner 
and  stravinsky,  which  subsequent  composers  draw  on.  yet  there  are  two 
limitations of the focus on “research.” one, which i was well aware of in the 
1960s, was that new technologies are not costlessly absorbed into the market 
economy, so the link from invention to innovation is not prompt or reliable. 
it takes a schumpeter-type entrepreneur to solve the problems in develop-38
ing and marketing an innovation; it takes nelson-Phelps managers to solve 
the problem of evaluating the innovation’s likely gains, if any; it takes amar 
Bhidé-type consumers to solve the problem of evaluating the gains, if any, 
of bringing an innovation home; and it takes Marschak-nelson financiers 
who can do better than choosing randomly in deciding which entrepreneurs 
to back. in sum, it takes a whole village for an innovation to be developed, 
launched and adopted.
The paper by nelson and Phelps (1966) was not written in the terminology 
of ellsberg and the savage axioms but it is about ambiguity. The manager of a 
vineyard confronting a new insecticide might have no idea what the “expected 
value” of the benefit and the cost of using a new insecticide would be – or 
what the probability of successful adoption would be – if he lacked an educa-
tion in basic science and humanities. a modicum of knowledge of engineer-
ing, chemistry and other fields improves a manager’s ability to evaluate a new 
product or technique and thus bolsters the manager’s confidence enough to 
encourage him to evaluate innovations that he would otherwise ignore.30
in Phelps (2000, 200) i argued that continental europe is under-pre-
pared to be a launch pad for novel innovations such as those of the internet 
revolution by a dearth of nelson-Phelps-type managers – and of venturesome 
Bhidé-type consumers – owing to the scarcity of university educations. (How 
then did the continent latch on to the american things during its Glorious 
years? Those things were too old to be still very novel.) similarly, Bhidé and 
Phelps (200) argue that the vast learning that managers and consumers 
have to do is a drag on successful innovation in china. otherwise, investment 
and consumer demand would both be stronger, the current account surplus 
smaller and growth faster.
The other severe limitation of the research view was, of course, that business 
people are the conceivers of the bulk of the innovations of a capitalist economy. 
capitalism is Hayek country. in such an economy, Hayek says, there is a “divi-
sion of knowledge” among different persons – not only dispersed informa-
tion (“knowledge of current prices”) but, crucially, dispersed know-how about 
“how commodities can be obtained and used.”31 (Hayek, 1937). Hayekian en-
trepreneurs are constantly striving to expand their knowledge into some area 
30  The paper was ignored during the reign of rational expectations dating from the mid ’70s. 
But “a few good men” bent on understanding the world took it up. (Barro and sala-i-Martin, 
1997; aghion and Howitt, 1998). results from regressions run by Benhabib and spiegel (1994) 
also revived the nelson-Phelps thesis. There, a crude version of nelson-Phelps, in which all 
education (even primary schooling) is useful for evaluating and absorbing innovations defeated 
the Becker-Mincer thesis that all education (even college education) belongs in the production 
function as an augmenter of raw labor input. The glory did not last long, as Krueger and Lindahl 
(2001) found mistakes and concluded that nelson-Phelps did not work well in Europe in the 
postwar era. i reply that the continent had little real novelty to cope with when it was catching 
up with U.s. technology in the ’60s and ’70s, so no nelson-Phelps managers were required. 
Moreover, it is college education that is crucial for catch-up, not total education.
31  intertemporal equilibrium, he adds, probably unnecessarily, entails that the expectations 
inevitably formed by firms be consistent, but does not entail that all valuable knowledge has 
been obtained.39
where knowledge is scarce or non-existent in order to see whether they might 
develop something commercially saleable that no one else has conceived 
before. This is creativity – acquiring ideas that no one else has (or likely will 
have without doing the necessary exploration). Later he sketched a model of 
how the entrepreneur, not really knowing its commercial value, has to launch 
the innovation on the market to “discover” its value, if any32 (Hayek, 1968).
i have tried in recent years to elaborate and apply Hayek’s theory of inno-
vation. a recent paper formalizes the theory of innovation with the theoreti-
cal device of a periodic fair in which entrepreneurs and financiers meet and 
enter into matches despite incomplete information (Phelps, 2006b). i have 
also been fortunate in coming up with some empirical findings: The pres-
ence or absence of important financial institutions, such as the stock market, 
appears to be quite important for the readiness of an economy to seize an 
innovative opportunity (Phelps and Zoega, 2001). furthermore, various at-
tributes of a country’s economic culture serve to animate entrepreneurs and, 
more broadly, to encourage them by offering them a willing workforce and 
a receptive marketplace for their innovations. (Phelps, 2006c) (see Tables 1, 
2a, 2b and 3.) The direction in which i have mainly gone is to argue that, in 
advanced economies at any rate, innovation mechanism and discovery largely 
shape the experience and the rewards of participating in the economy.
Table 1. Classical Wants, or Values, at Work 













states 2% 69% 61% 1.47 1.11
canada 4% 72% 6% 1.34 1.01
Great 
Britain 4% 71% 43% 1.32 0.7
france 38% 9% 8% 1.19 0.67
italy 47% 9% 4% 1.04 0.48
Germany 9% 69% 7% 1.13 1.21
G7 ex Japan 49% 67% 6% 1.21 0.8
survey results from Human Beliefs and Values survey, inglehart et al. Taking orders and 
competing with others are measured on a scale from 0 to 2, 2 highest.
32  To embroider a little a remark by amar Bhidé, the schumpeterian chef works away in his 
kitchen to zero in on the exact recipe that fills the bill while the Hayekian chef, having little idea 
of what diners would like, experiments on his customers. see Hayek (1961 and 1968 lecture).360
Table 2a. Pride and Satisfaction Derived from the Job (on a scale of 1–10) and the 



















states  9.7 7.8 81% 87% 7%
canada  9.0 7.9 84% 89% 79%
Great 
Britain  9.3 7.4 74% 8% 63%
france  .7 6.8 9% 72% 46%
italy  6.7 7.3 71% 81% 61%
Germany  6.0 7.0 71% 76% 66%
Japan  7.3 na 3% 62% 44%
survey results from Human Beliefs and Values survey, inglehart et al.
Table 2b. Circumstantial Evidence and Other Performance Indicators
 
Male labor 




















states 8% 70% 94% $31,994  100
canada 8% 69% 92% $23,71  -
Great 
Britain 8% 67% 9% $22,008  73
france 76% 61% 90% $24,192  92
italy 76% 4% 91% $21,822  -
Germany 79% 62% 91% $23,946  92
Men in the labor force in % of working age men and employment in % of the labor force 
are computed for 2003 (oecd); labor compensation per worker is computed as the ratio 
of total compensation to the labor force using 1996 data (extended Penn World Tables); 
market output per hour worked is for 1992 (solow/Baily).361













United states 7.4 118% 3.7 2.9
canada 7.2 106% 1.3 1.8
Great Britain 7.0 6% 0.8 1.9
france 6.4 79% 0.9 2.2
italy 6.7 63% 0.4 1.0
Germany 6.1 42% 1. 2.2
decision making freedom at work is measured on a scale from 1 to 10, 10 highest, aver-
aged for 1990–1993 (Human Beliefs and Values, inglehart et al.); turnover of listed firms 
represents the number of exits from and entries into each country’s Msci national stock 
index from 2001 to 2006 as a % of the number of firms in 2001; patenting data is averaged 
for 1990–2003 (World intellectual Property organization); r&d intensity adjusted for 
industry structure is the average in per cent of business sector value added for 1999–2002 
using the G7 industry structure (oecd). 
THe Good econoMy: innoVaTiVe and incLUsiVe
My interest in the modern economy and my familiarity with some existing 
wisdom on human fulfillment have drawn me in the past couple of decades 
to the question of the good economy. This was not entirely new territory for 
me. in showing that “statistical discrimination,” which deprives individuals of 
opportunities and weakens their incentives to prepare and to excel, is all too 
natural in the presence of information costs, i was suggesting that it is hard 
to prevent stereotyping and that an ideal economy is out of reach. (Phelps, 
1972c) in some work on morality in markets i argued that a little altruism 
inhibits various antisocial acts that, owing to asymmetric information, the 
market mechanism and legislation cannot prevent (Phelps, 1973). The book 
by rawls (1971) stimulated me to expound to economists his conception of 
“economic justice” (Phelps, 1973b; Phelps, 198) and to apply (he preferred 
“test”) that conception in imperfect-information models of taxation (Phelps, 
1973a; ordover and Phelps, 197). as noted, these ideas in every case hinged 
on one or another informational imperfection. yet all of these models and 
rawls’s model of the economy too took an austere view of the sources of hu-
man satisfaction, a view inherited from classical economics. These and other 
classical models left us without conceptions of the good economy suitable to 
modern possibilities.
it is axiomatic that one’s conception of the good economy depends upon 
one’s conception of the good life. for calvin (136) the good life consisted of 
hard work and wealth accumulation. for Hayek (1944) and friedman (1962) 
the good life was a life of freedom. The appeal of work and of freedom may 362
be that they are necessary for a good life.33 But what is its substance, its es-
sence?
in a 2003 conference i proposed that a career of challenge and personal 
development is the essence of the good life (Phelps, 2007). it was commented 
that this is a “very american” view. in replying i began to remember that this 
view is the classical theory of what the good life is, a theory that originated in 
europe: aristotle declared that people everywhere wanted to expand their 
horizons  and  “discover  their  talents.”  The  renaissance  figure  cellini  de-
scribed the joys of creativity and “making it” in his autobiography. in Baroque 
times cervantes and shakespeare dramatize the individual’s quest – a moral 
view Barzun and Bloom call vitalism. such a view is reflected to a degree by 
Jefferson and Voltaire among other enlightenment figures and is interpreted 
by the pragmatist philosophers William James and Henri Bergson.34 The 
“self-actualization” in Maslow and “self-realization” in rawls both refer to all 
of this as do the “capabilities” and “doing things” in sen (199). This concept 
of human fulfillment obviously differs from Bentham’s theory of happiness, 
or “felicity,” and it need not correlate with reported happiness.3
if that is the substance of the good life, it appears that a good economy pro-
motes “vitalist” lives. it produces the stimulation, challenge, engagement, 
mastery, discovery and development that constitute the good life.
There are also the claims of justice. The disadvantaged have a right to 
inclusion  in  the  economy  and  thus  also  in  society.  in  the  perspective  of 
rawls (1971) inclusion means that the least advantaged toil in the formal 
economy under terms affording them prospects of self-realization – their 
pay good enough (and their joblessness infrequent enough) to permit them 
to function as spouses, parents, citizens and community members. rawls’s 
economics, being largely classical, left no room for self-realization obtained 
from business life. in my discussion i say that many and perhaps most people 
draw deep satisfaction from taking part in what is the central institution of 
an economically advanced society, namely its business economy, and that for 
minorities such employment is the spine of social integration (Phelps, 1997). 
Moreover, in a society having a vitalist work culture that values mental chal-
lenge, organizational responsibility and individual initiative, it is not impos-
sible that even low-end employment contributes to self-realization; so a high 
33  in any case, these conceptions of the good economy are not rich enough to provide a political 
economy for our times. calvinism appears consistent with a property-owning market socialism. 
aside from friedman’s negative income tax and middle-Hayek’s several exceptions, both of them 
appeared more enthusiastic about a free market economy – small government and atomistic 
competition -- than the speculative swings and gleeful commercialism of today’s capitalism (in 
those places where it thrives).
34  The french philosopher Bergson rose to fame in the years just before the Great War with his 
book affirming “becoming” over “being” and free will over determinism.
3  i know that recent researchers on happiness find that, after a certain level, nations would 
not gain added happiness by accumulating greater wealth with which to earn greater income. 
(That sounds a bit like the golden rule of asset accumulation.) That finding, whether or not it 
will stand up, does not imply that there is some satiation level of the classical gratifications. it only 
suggests that, after a point, higher income does not boost satisfaction of the classical wants.363
degree of inclusion may be all the more valuable in an economy offering 
vitalist careers. (What i say below does not hinge on that.) in short, a good 
economy also promotes inclusion.
a country can promote both vitality and inclusion by fitting its economy 
with  the  right  mechanisms.  our  theoretical  understanding  of  modern 
economies, its rudimentary state notwithstanding, and the bulk of empirical   
evidence strongly suggest that careers of vitality require an economy gener-
ating change and a generally forward motion; and such economic dynamism 
is best served by a system of institutions and mechanisms like capitalism – regu-
lated and de-regulated as required in order to provide a high rate of com-
mercially successful innovation of non-coordinated entrepreneurs, financiers 
and consumers. our theoretical understanding of incentive design and em-
pirical observation strongly suggest that inclusion is most effectively served by 
fiscal incentives – a system of public low-wage employment subsidies as well as 
classical education subsidies in order to attract marginalized workers to the 
business sector, shrink their unemployment rates and boost their pay.36
are vitality and inclusion incompatible, gains in the one undoing gains in 
the other? Two fallacies here have gotten in the way of consensus for action. 
in the West, it is believed by many, with no foundation i know of, that a fis-
cal policy aimed at broad economic inclusion would substantially preclude 
ample economic dynamism and thus a vitalist society. i have argued that, 
on the contrary, suitably designed employment subsidies would restore the 
bourgeois culture, revive the ethic of self-support and increase prosperity in 
low-wage communities. That would boost a country’s dynamism, not weaken 
it, and also strengthen popular support for capitalist institutions (Phelps, 
1997).
it is believed by many others that the dynamism of an entrepreneurial 
economy harms disadvantaged workers. i argue that economic dynamism 
works to raise inclusion. Heightened entrepreneurial activity indirectly lifts 
up both those already enjoying much of the good life and – up to a point, at 
any rate – disadvantaged workers too, taken as a group. The resulting dyna-
mism, the stepped-up rate of commercially successful innovation, creates jobs 
in new activities and in so doing it draws the disadvantaged into better work 
and higher pay. a look at the experience around us in the present decade 
suggests that the disadvantaged have suffered an acute failure of inclusion 
in economies that are resistant to innovation. Heightened entrepreneurship 
also tends to serve the disadvantaged directly by making their jobs less bur-
densome and dangerous – and perhaps also more engaging. an innovative 
economy is not unjust, since it helps the disadvantaged as well as the advan-
taged (Phelps, 2007).
36  rawls (1971) argues for going in this direction to the greatest possible extent. i would inject 
here that rawlsian justice in a modern economy must consider the prospects for self-realization 
of entrepreneurial types as well as the lowest-wage workers. But i will not defend that here.364
now, in europe, a great many countries are searching for a route to greater 
general prosperity and greater economic inclusion of disadvantaged groups. 
There is a debate in the making between, on the one hand, those neoclassicals 
who would put the emphasis on pushing more resources into the economy 
(more technology or more human capital) as a way of raising output and em-
ployment; and, on the other hand, those modernizers who favor a strategy of 
pulling existing resources into innovative activity and general business activity 
through reforms of labor law, company law and the financial sector.
My conclusion is that a morally acceptable economy must have enough 
dynamism to make work amply engaging and rewarding; and have enough 
justice, if dynamism alone cannot do the job, to secure ample inclusion.
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